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THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION: 
RECONSTITUTING PLANNED 
PARENTHOODv.CASEY 
Nadine Strossen* 
Ronald K.L. Collins** 
On Thursday, February 28, 1985, a 9 mm bullet pierced the 
window of Justice Harry Blackmun's high-rise apartment. 
Whether by chance or design, the bullet that missed a mark took 
on symbolic importance-Roe v. Wade1 was still very much un-
der attack. That attack continues to manifest itself in a variety 
of ways, from proposed constitutional amendments to clinic 
bombings to assassinations of doctors. Those, of course, are 
among the most extreme and blatant attacks by anti-Roe zealots. 
Roe has also been besieged by other attacks, more subtle 
but nonetheless significant, which were facilitated by three Su-
preme Court Justices who proclaimed that they were defending 
it and, we assume, acted in good faith. We refer, of course, to 
the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 jointly 
authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. 
What if Casey had been decided differently? What if Jus-
tice O'Connor and/or Justice Kennedy had joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas to overrule 
* Professor of Law at New York Law School and President of the American Civil 
Liberties Union. (It should be noted that the ACLU represented Planned Parenthood in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, urging the Supreme Court to 
reaffirm Roe v. Wade in its entirety.) The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance 
of Professor Strossen's Chief Aide, Amy L. Tenney, and her Research Assistant, Cesar 
DeCastro. An online version of this commentary may be found on the Jurist website 
(online articles) at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu>. 
** Ronald Collins heads a First Amendment project sponsored by a public interest 
group in Washington, D.C.; he is also the co-editor of Books-on-Law 
(http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks). The title is borrowed from Sigmund Freud, sans any 
Freudian implications ... as far as we are aware. 
I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Roe v. Wade outright,3 as O'Connor and Kennedy had previously 
suggested they might be inclined to dot 
Rather than leaping headlong into the politics of 1992-1993 
and the fate of the Freedom of Choice Act, then pending in 
Congress, we prefer to begin with some observations about Ca-
sey and how it has affected public perceptions of reproductive 
freedom in America. 
***** 
"[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained 
and once again reaffirmed," declared the Casey plurality opin-
ion.5 That opinion reiterated the "unbroken commitment by this 
Court to the essential holding of Roe. "6 As if two such profes-
sions of constitutional fidelity were not enough, the joint opinion 
further proclaimed: "[O]ur ... analysis does not disturb the cen-
tral holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding."7 
With Orwellian facility, Roe's essence had been redefined. 
Never mind that what was once a "fundamental right,"8 trigger-
ing strict judicial scrutiny of any restrictions, was relegated to 
constitutional limbo as a "liberty claim [ ]," 9 warranting judicial 
review of any restrictions only under the deferential, malleable 
"undue burden" rubric. 10 Never mind, also, that government of-
ficials were licensed to circumscribe women's "liberty claims"11 
3. The Casey dissenters may well have had a fifth vote if that 1985 bullet had hit 
and killed Justice Blackmun. In such a tragic event, President Reagan likely would have 
sought to nominate an anti-Roe candidate. 
4. Sec Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 517 (1989) (per Rehnquist, 
C.J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.) ("[T]hc doubt cast on the Missouri statute by 
these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that [Roe's] 
rigid trimester analysis" has proved to be unsound and unworkable in practice); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-15 (1986) 
(O'Connor, J. dissenting) ("That the Court's unworkable scheme for constitutionalizing 
the regulation or abortion has had this institutionally debilitating effect should not be 
surprising, however, since the Court is not suited to the expansive role it has claimed for 
itself in the series of cases that began with Roe v. Wade . ... "). 
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
6. ld. at 870. 
7. Id. at 879. 
8. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.l (1983) 
("Since Roe was decided in January 1973, the Court repeatedly and consistently has ac-
cepted and applied the basic principle that a woman has a fundamental right to make the 
highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.") (citations omitted). 
9. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
10. Id. at 876. To its credit, the Casey plurality opinion eschews the approach of 
Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (cited in note 4), which had remitted the Roe right to the even 
more debased status of a mere "liberty interest," whose infringement triggers only the 
highly deferential rational basis review. See id. at 520. 
II. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
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in controlling their own bodies, lives, and health through restric-
tions that, in practice, demonstrably preclude abortion as a fea-
sible option for many women-in particular, those who are 
young, poor, or live far from an abortion provider. 
Ironically, the illusory nature of Casey's so-called "reaf-
firmation" of Roe's "central holding"-which had already been 
devalued by pre-Casey rulings12 - was immediately assailed not 
only by pro-choice advocates, but also by that staunch opponent 
of Roe, Chief Justice Rehnquist. While his opinion in Casey de-
plored the plurality's failure to overturn Roe explicitly and di-
rectly, it simultaneously derided the plurality's handiwork as 
having, in effect, achieved that result covertly and indirectly. 
While the plurality protested-perhaps, to quote the Bard, "too 
much"-that what it had preserved was the "essential" or "cen-
tral'' holding of Roe, the Chief Justice dismissed these remains as 
Roe's "outer shell."13 In his mocking terms: "Roe continues to 
exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set ex-
ists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality."14 In the same 
vein, he caustically commented: "Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of 
judicial Potemkin Village, which may be pointed out to pass-
ers-by as a monument to the importance of adhering to prece-
dent."15 
The hopes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the fears of pro-
choice activists have indeed been substantially realized. The Ca-
sey plurality opinion facilitated various and devastating attacks 
on reproductive freedom. In that sense, insofar as it was in-
tended to reinvigorate the real Roe right, the plurality opinion 
has been a failure. But insofar as it was designed to convince the 
public that Roe is safe and working, the plurality opinion has 
been a success-with dismaying consequences for the reproduc-
tive freedom movement and for the actual rights of real women. 
What has proven to be important has been the broad public 
(mis )perception of the plurality's constitutional handiwork- the 
idea that some common ground had been discovered, and that 
the actual right vouchsafed in Roe really had survived, albeit 
with some few and not overly burdensome qualifications. 
12. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster, 492 U.S. 490; City of 
Akron, 462 U.S. 416; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In our view, the Casey Court 
extended existing deviations from Roe's core principles. 
13. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (cited in note 2) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
14. ld. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
15. ld. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Casey thus fostered a "Roe was saved" public mindset. 
Such mantra magic has buttressed the belief that the realities of 
abortion do or will coincide with the bold declarations of the 
plurality opinion. Yet, unfortunately, that has not occurred. 
* * * * * 
Casey's lip-service to Roe's "essential holding" must be 
judged against the realities of reproductive freedom. Consider 
the following examples (pre- and post-Casey) of real-world con-
straints on meaningful access to a range of reproductive services 
and options, including abortion. As of this writing: 
• Only twelve percent of all residency programs in obstetrics 
and gynecology require routine training in first-trimester 
abortions; 
• Over eighty-five percent of all U.S. counties, which are home 
to a full third of all women of childbearing age, have not a 
single abortion provider; 
• Almost one in four abortion clinics has faced severe 
anti-abortion violence, making it ever more difficult for any 
such clinics to obtain insurance and rental property; 
• There are ninety-one counties where a Catholic hospital, 
which provides no abortion services, is the sole health care 
provider. Ninety-five percent of those hospitals are in coun-
ties with a minority Catholic population; 
• Mergers between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals are 
rising sharply, with a total of 127 between 1990 and 1998. In 
almost half of the cases studied during this period, all or 
some of the reproductive health services that previously had 
been provided by the non-Catholic hospital (including birth 
control, emergency contraception (the "morning-after pill"), 
sterilization, and abortion) were eliminated following the 
merger; 
• Over twenty-five percent of all states prohibit all or some 
types of insurance coverage for abortion; four states prohibit 
any such coverage, while ten prohibit such coverage for pub-
lic employees using public funds; 
• Thirty-two states do not fund abortions for women receiving 
Medicaid (although they do fund pregnancy and perinatal 
services for those women) unless a pregnancy endangers the 
woman's life or is the result of rape or incest; 
• At least fourteen states require a delay following 
state-directed "counseling" -which is skewed to discourage 
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abortion, often through misleading propaganda- before a 
woman may obtain an abortion. Eight additional states re-
quire such "counseling" (without a mandatory delay) before 
a woman may obtain an abortion; 
• At least twenty-nine states require parental consent (fifteen 
states) or notification (fourteen states) before a minor may 
obtain an abortion; 
• At least eleven states enforce bans against so-called "par-
tial-birth" abortions (eight apply at all stages, three apply 
post-viability only). Despite the distorted, inflammatory la-
bel and rhetoric, most of these laws are so broadly and 
vaguely written that they threaten all abortion procedures 
throughout pregnancy; 
• Several states are attempting to impose cumbersome, expen-
sive, and unwarranted requirements on abortion clinics, un-
der the guise of health and safety regulations;16 and 
• The House of the 106th Congress passed a bill granting legal 
status to a fetus by establishing criminal penalties for anyone 
who injures or harms a fetus. 17 
The aforementioned facts highlight the attenuated status of 
reproductive freedom in America, a reality at odds with the 
spirit, as well as the letter, of Roe. However well-intended, the 
Casey joint opinion provided at least political encouragement, 
and at worst judicial sanction, for such real-world threats and re-
strictions on reproductive freedom. What is becoming increas-
ingly apparent, however valuable the judicial check on legisla-
tion, is that meaningful access to abortion continues to be 
eroded while the "essential holding of Roe" continues to be reaf-
firmed.18 
* * * * * 
To return to the call of the question: What if Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey had been decided differently? What if Roe had 
been reversed outright and completely, rather than, as Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist charged, indirectly and evasively? Here are a few 
of our guesses: 
16. All of the data come from The Alan Guttmacher Institute (Wash., D.C.) except 
for the data on clinic violence (Feminist Majority Foundation, Arlington, VA.), on 
ob/gyn residency programs (Medical Students for Choice, Wash.,D.C.), and on Catholic 
hospitals and their mergers with other hospitals (Catholics for Free Choice, Wash., D.C.). 
17. Sec Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999, H.R. 2436, 106th Cong. (1999). 
18. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
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• Criminal bans on abortion-such as the ones in Louisiana, 
Utah, and Guam-might well have been upheld, with more 
states following suit, putting women's health in serious jeop-
ardy; 
• There would have been considerable pressure on the then-
Democratically-controlled Congress to pass the Freedom of 
Choice Act (FOCA), which was intended to codify Roe's 
principles as a matter of federal statutory law. President 
Bush, however, probably would have vetoed such legislation 
with a slim likelihood of his veto being overridden; 
• Bill Clinton's margin of victory in 1992 might well have been 
greater if Roe had been reversed and FOCA vetoed; 
• In 1993, a Democratically controlled Congress and a Clinton 
Administration with a pro-choice mandate would have had a 
clear political imperative to pass FOCA, and they might well 
have succeeded; and 
• The outcomes of the 1994 congressional races might have 
been notably different if pro-choice voters perceived that it 
was essential to keep pro-choice lawmakers in office. Then 
again, the passage of FOCA might have led, in time, to an 
anti-abortion backlash. 
If nothing else, such speculation suggests a reasonable as-
sumption-namely, that had Roe been reversed outright, the 
politics of abortion would have reflected a significant mobiliza-
tion of pro-choice forces, a development that Casey deterred. 
The formal reversal of Roe, in other words, might well have 
strengthened the reproductive rights movement in much the 
same way that Roe itself galvanized the anti-abortion movement. 
If so, this suggests a possible repeat phenomenon, a cyclic back-
and-forth campaign between the respective forces. Under our 
scenario, accordingly, the passage of FOCA in tum might have 
stimulated a re-energization of the anti-abortion movement, 
perhaps leading to a Congressional repeal of FOCA, or at least 
to a scaling-back of its protections. When the political dust fi-
nally settled, the national legislative result could well have mir-
rored the status quo post-Casey. 
We can speculate until the proverbial cows come home as to 
which "result" would prove most rights-protective in the long 
run. That there can be some degree of doubt on this point-and 
we stress that there can be-calls to mind a more important les-
son. It is this: Civil libertarians proceed at their peril if they as-
sume that the protection of rights is exclusively or even primarily 
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the responsibility of the judiciary. Living as we do in what re-
mains of the legacy of the Warren Court, too many civil liber-
tarians have become too accustomed to leaving too much to the 
courts and too little to the legislatures when it comes to safe-
guarding rights. This is not-and we emphasize this point-
some Borkean call for judicial abdication. Rather, it is a call for 
a more proactive rights-protective legislative agenda to comple-
ment the gains made by judicial review. It is a lesson in progres-
sive reform- a lesson long ago put into practice by Louis Bran-
deis with significant support from Josephine Goldmark and 
Florence Kelly. 19 Sadly, however, it is a lesson that too many 
civil libertarians have unlearned. 
To some extent, judicial declarations have blinded some 
civil libertarians to the realities of life; to the realities of every-
thing from abortion rights post-Roe to custodial rights post-
Miranda.20 Life is not always what the law, or a plurality of Jus-
tices, says it is. Roe is being deconstructed year-in and year-out, 
law after law, decision after decision, regulation after regulation, 
and all of this buttressed by the ongoing hostilities toward re-
productive service providers. Meanwhile, Casey assures us that 
all is "essentially" well, that Roe is "essentially" safe. While 
Roe's reversal would have gravely endangered women's rights 
and bodies, such a declaration of war would have been seen for 
what it was and would not have invited the false security fos-
tered by Casey. 
The essential problem with Casey-i.e., creating illusory 
perceptions that camouflage reality-is that it encourages the 
supporters of reproductive rights to fiddle while their Rome 
burns. But, given today's realities, they cannot afford to be 
Neronian. If they are, they may only be "excused by two facts: 
[they do] not know that [they] fiddle[ ], and [they do] not know 
that Rome burns. "21 
19. These two women were an essential part of the Brandeis campaign for progres-
sive legislative reform (and also played a major role in writing the famous "Brandeis 
brief'). See Ronald K.L. Collins and Jennifer Friesen. Looking Back on Muller v. Ore-
gon: Pan I, 69 A.B.A. J. 294 (1983); Jennifer Friesen and Ronald K.L. Collins, Looking 
Back on Muller v. Oregon: Pan II, 69 A.B.A. J. 472 {1983). 
20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
21. Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern 223 (Basic Books, 1968). 
